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DARK MONEY IN MOTION:  MAPPING 
ISSUES ALONG THE MONEY TRAIL 
Frances R. Hill∗ 
It is now becoming clear that dark money is money in motion.1  
Moreover, dark money is moving on carefully designed and centrally 
controlled money trails that exist for purposes ranging from winning the 
next election to consolidating power in a much more encompassing sense 
over the long term.  While relatively little is known about the operation of 
particular money trails, the information currently available suggests that 
they consist of multiple types of taxable and tax exempt entities through 
which money moves in complex and intentional patterns, and that most 
of the component entities offer some degree of protection against 
disclosure.  If the component entities offer this kind of disclosure shield, 
nothing is gained by putting the political money in motion in such 
carefully designed and operated money trails.  If money moves through 
several non-disclosing entities, it becomes necessary to trace the money 
through each of the entities, which is not only extremely difficult, but is 
also very costly and time-consuming.  This is particularly useful in the 
case of political money where the dark money organizations are subject to 
limited disclosure—not protected completely against disclosure. 
Awareness of money trails increased when the Center for Responsive 
Politics, together with the Washington Post, published diagrams of 
complex money trails developed by the Koch Brothers’ political 
enterprises during the 2012 election cycle.2  While the Koch Brothers may 
                                                 
∗ Professor of Law and Dean’s Distinguished Scholar for the Profession, University of 
Miami School of Law.  This piece is a part of the Valparaiso University Law School’s 2014 
Symposium  For more pieces from the symposium, see Valparaiso University Law School 
Symposium:  Money in Politics:  The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 49 VAL. U. L. REV. (2015). 
1 As used in this Essay, “dark money” refers to money that is in or passes through one or 
more organizations that are subject, under applicable law, to only limited disclosure or to no 
disclosure requirements relating to either sources or uses.  As a result, interested members 
of the public are unable to access information that they might reasonably regard as relevant 
to their evaluation of the message being conveyed. 
2 Communications, The Koch Network:  A Cartological Guide, OPENSECRETS (Jan. 7, 2014), 
http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/01/koch-network-a-cartological-guide/, 
archived at http://perma.cc/VYC6-HJWL [hereinafter The Koch Network]; see also Matea Gold, 
Koch-Backed Political Network, Built to Shield Donors, Raised $400 Million in 2012 Elections, 
WASH. POST (Jan. 5, 2014), available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/ politics/koch-
backed-political-network-built-to-shield-donors-raised-400-million-in-2012-elections/2014/ 
01/05/9e7cfd9a-719b-11e3-9389-09ef9944065e_story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
KJG2-ECWL [hereinafter Koch-Backed Political Network].  For broader coverage of the money 
trails, see the OpenSecrets Blog series, The Shadow Money Trail, and OpenSecrets.org series, 
at http://www.opensecrets.org/news/reports/money trail.php (last visited Apr. 17, 2015), 
archived at http://perma.cc/6L9S-BQU8.  For yet another analysis of the structure and 
operation of the Koch money trails, see Kim Barker & Theodoric Meyer, Who Controls the 
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be leaders in the development of this kind of complex contemporary 
money trail, the Democrats made efforts to catch up, which led some 
Republicans to prepare their own chart of what they describe as the 
Democracy Alliance Political Activist Network.3  The chart shows the 
Democracy Alliance surrounded by concentric circles of twenty-one “Core 
Organizations” and 161 “Partner and Aligned Network Organizations.”4  
The Koch money trail was redesigned and reengineered for the 2014 mid-
term elections.5  The Democrats built something of a money trail around 
the Senate Majority Political Action Committee (“PAC”), which is an 
entity that discloses its contributors and its uses of the money it collects to 
the Federal Election Commission (“FEC”).  The Senate Majority PAC is 
operated by “political confidants” of Senator Harry Reid, then the majority 
leader of the Senate.6  Former Vice President Dick Cheney and his 
daughter, Liz, announced the creation of a new section 501(c)(4) social 
welfare organization called the Alliance for a Stronger America, which is 
simply one more non-disclosing entity among the many such entities that 
the Cheneys used in their political endeavors for decades.7 
Money trails put money in motion in complex patterns before the 
money is eventually deployed to achieve political goals.  It is the 
movement of money that distinguishes the money trails among the 
various types of political actors.  The implications of putting dark money 
in motion in this way are far from clear.  Neither federal election law nor 
federal tax law provides much guidance.  Existing judicial precedents take 
little account of any movement of money among parties prior to its use for 
                                                 
Kochs’ Political Network?  ASMI, SLAH and TOHE, PRO PUBLICA (Mar. 17, 2014), available at 
http://www.propublica.org/article/who-controls-koch-political-network-asmi-slah-tohe, 
archived at http://perma.cc/RGY7-LHHW. 
3 Democracy Alliance Political Activist Network, WASH. POST, available at 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/r/2010-2019/WashingtonPost/2014/09/04/National-
Politics/Images/kochgraphic.png (last visited Nov. 5, 2014), archived at 
http://perma.cc/85TE-SYRB (displaying the chart the Republicans have developed to show 
what they describe as the Democrats’ money trail for the mid-term election). 
4 Id. 
5 Kenneth P. Vogel & Darren Goode, Kochs Launch New Super PAC for Midterm Fight, 
POLITICO (June 16, 2014, 8:20 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/06/2014-
elections-koch-brothers-super-pac-107926.html, archived at http://perma.cc/S4EU-QRVG; 
Nicholas Confessore, Koch Group Forms ‘Super PAC’ as 2014 Races Near, N.Y. TIMES (June 17, 
2014), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/06/18/us/politics/koch-group-forms-
super-pac-as-2014-races-near.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/BVS5-PTAN. 
6 Kenneth P. Vogel & Tarini Parti, Democrats Relying on Big Donors to Win, POLITICO (Sept. 
22, 2014, 7:49 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/09/democrats-big-donors-2014-
elections-111225.html, archived at http://perma.cc/DB64-7W8A. 
7 Robert Maguire, Dick Cheney Goes Dark:  A Family Network of (c)(4) Groups, OPENSECRETS 
(July 2, 2014), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2014/07/dick-cheney-goes-dark-a-
family-network-of-c4-groups/, archived at http://perma.cc/8UVN-BCGM. 
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an independent expenditure or a contribution.  Designing and operating 
money trails comes at significant cost in the form of fees paid to lawyers, 
political consultants, management consultants, messaging consultant, and 
campaign strategists.8  The question is why.  The most commonly 
discussed and easily comprehensible reason for creating complex money 
trails is to disguise the identity of contributors.  The Koch Brothers 
themselves are certainly not hiding their political involvement, but they 
are not revealing much about how they are implementing their political 
objectives. 
Some of the more colorful billionaires who financed fringe candidates 
in the 2012 Republican presidential primaries have never left the political 
stage.9  Other substantial contributors may place a greater value on 
privacy.  Yet, the degree of complexity seems disproportionate to 
achieving this kind of privacy.  Something other than defeating the easily 
evaded disclosure rules seems to be part of the decisions to design money 
trails for putting dark money in motion.  This essay suggests that money 
trails are being constructed to facilitate centralized command and control, 
while creating the impression of a coalition designed to facilitate 
participation and representation.  This kind of masked control mechanism 
serves two purposes.  It enhances the effectiveness of the very large 
amounts of money that the participants are able to raise, and it masks the 
extent of the common purpose beyond winning the next election.  An 
effective dark money trail can enhance the power of money in ways that 
enable money trails to serve as the infrastructure for transformative 
political activities at the federal, state, and local levels. 
Part I addresses the issue of how to think about money trails by 
considering two possible analytical templates.  Part II looks at what law 
might be applicable to the operation of money trails.  It also explores the 
implications of the non-enforcement of existing law and judicial disregard 
                                                 
8 For a detailed report of the role and compensation of one of the central consultants to 
the Koch money trails in the 2012 election cycle, see Kim Barker & Theodoric Meyer, The Dark 
Money Man: How Sean Noble Moved the Kochs’ Cash into Politics and Made Millions (Feb. 14, 
2011), available at http://www.propublica.org/article/the-dark-money-man-how-sean-
noble-moved-the-kochs-cash-into-politics-and-ma, archived at http://perma.cc/9MZP-
HNH9.  For a similar study of a Democratic political operative and fundraiser for the 
Democracy Alliance and other organizations earning commissions so lavish that they 
generated pushback among donors, see Nicholas Confessore, The Secret Worlds of a Well-Paid 
‘Donor Adviser’ in Politics, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2015), available at http://www.nytimes.com/ 
2015/02/06/us/in-invisible-world-of-political-donor-advisers-a-highly-visible-player. 
html, archived at http://perma.cc/C5ZP-ZDKV. 
9 See Thomas B. Edsall, Billionaires Going Rogue, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2012, 10:53 PM), 
available at http://campaignstops.blogs.nytimes.com/2012/10/28/billionaires-going-
rogue/, archived at http://perma.cc/5R55-8K53 (describing how billionaires financed the 
2012 Republican President primaries). 
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of judicial precedents that have never been overruled.  Part III moves from 
a consideration of the gaps between the formal law and the law as 
enforced to a consideration of money trails and democratic principles.  
The tendency to see money trails primarily in terms of the role and goals 
of the Koch Brothers or similar mega-donors may well be important 
tactically, but may obscure the larger issues of how the consolidation of 
economic and political power through money trails may constrain the 
ability of “we the people” to exercise our authority under the Constitution 
in an era of increasing inequality.10 
I.  MONEY TRAILS:  DESCRIPTIONS AND ANALYTICAL APPROACHES 
Money trails through which dark money is put in motion became 
coterminous with the Koch Brothers.  The reasons are certainly 
compelling.  The scope and structure of the Koch Brothers’ money trails 
during the 2012 election cycle appeared to be unprecedented, and their 
plans to spend almost a billion dollars in the 2016 election cycle suggest 
that the same will be true going forward.11  The enterprise not only moved 
a great deal of money during the 2012 election cycle, but also required a 
great deal of money to design and operate.12  The money trails represent a 
significant investment in the outcome of the 2012 election and in more 
broadly ambitious political goals relating to the conduct of elections and 
qualifications of voters.13  Why would two successful businessmen, who 
could use their great wealth in whatever ways they chose to influence the 
outcome of the 2012 election, choose to construct money trails?  Why 
would they choose to retain this model, albeit with a substantial redesign 
for the 2014 mid-term elections and beyond when the results of their 
                                                 
10 U.S. CONST. pmbl. (“We the people of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this 
Constitution for the United States of America.”); LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES:  POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 6–8 (2004); William J. 
Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:  Contemporary Ratification, 27 S. TEX. L. REV. 
433, 433–34 (1986). 
11 Nicolas Confessore, Koch Brothers Budget of $889 Million for 2016 is on Par with Both 
Parties’ Spending, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 26, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/ 
01/27/us/politics/kochs-plan-to-spend-900-million-on-2016-campaign.html, archived at 
http://perma.cc/SNT3-WNTX. 
12 See Gold, supra note 2 (discussing the amount of donors the money trails had).  The 
amount of money moved through the money trails is somewhat less opaque than the amount 
of money devoted to their design and operation.  Id.  Neither number can be established with 
any certainty precisely because the money trails deal in dark money moving through a series 
of entities, which are not subject to disclosure.  Id. 
13 See id. (acknowledging that political nonprofit organizations supported by the Kochs 
led the 2012 election financially). 
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investment in the 2012 election proved so disappointing to them?14  Why 
continue to design and operate money trials rather than trying something 
else? 
Like all of the other questions raised in this essay, these questions have 
no clear answers.  First, it seems apparent that enhancing non-disclosure 
by moving money through multiple entities that are subject to no or very 
limited disclosure requirements.  While the Koch Brothers have not 
hidden their involvement, they have not made public any information 
about the terms and scope of their involvement.15  In addition, they raise 
significant amounts of money at their biannual donor conferences at 
which people who are very wealthy, but not necessarily in the same 
fraction of the one percent that the Koch Brothers occupy, might not attend 
at all or might not pledge to make contributions if their actions were not 
private. 
Second, money trails are regarded as efficient structures for the kind 
of rapid response required in the political campaigns.  Money trails may 
be built on the premise that designing and operating carefully designed 
trails for putting money in motion in specific circumstances to achieve 
specific goals enhances the impact of money.  Such heightened impact 
might arise from having an array of entities that can be used to ensure that 
the publicly identified source of the money is consistent with the message 
being made by the specific use of the money. 
Third, a centrally coordinated money trail that can move money 
rapidly to meet particular needs, including a perceived need to make not 
only independent expenditures, but also transfers that could reasonably 
be characterized as candidate contributions that are prohibited for both 
                                                 
14 See Nicholas Confessore & Jesse Bidgood, Little to Show for Cash Flood by Bog Donors, 
N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 7, 2012), available at http://www.nytimes.com/2012/11/08/us/politics/ 
little-to-show-for-cash-flood-by-big-donors.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/TC2P-
BUAP  (providing initial reactions to 2012 losses); Kenneth P. Vogel, The Billion-Dollar Bust? 
POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2012 6:58 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/111283534.html, 
archived at http://perma.cc/3UCQ-JF68 (stating some Republican megadonors consider 
“shabging their ways” in response to 2012 defeat); Kenneth P. Vogel, Karl Rove Under Fire, 
POLITICO (Nov. 10, 2012 7:13 PM), http://www.politico.com/news/stories/1112/ 
83658.html, archived at http://perma.cc/V32S-W88W (providing criticism of results 
produced by Rove); Karen Tumulty, Karl Rove and His Super PAC Vos to Press on, WASH. POST 
(Nov. 10, 2012), http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/karl-rove-and-his-super-pac-
vow-to-press-on/2012/11/10/19ed28ea-2a96-11e2-b4e0-346287b7e56c_story.html, archived 
at http://perma.cc/DV86-V7BJ (calling the performance reviews of Rove “scathing”). 
15 The Kochs’ donor meetings are closed to the press, as they have a right to be, and 
reportedly feature tight security to implement this policy.  See also Lauren Windsor, Exclusive:  
Inside the Koch Brothers’ Secret Billionaire Summit, NATION (June 17, 2014), 
http://www.thenation.com/article/180267/exclusive-behind-koch-brothers-secret-
billionaire-summit, archived at http://perma.cc/9CRL-29R8 (discussing the Koch summer 
summit). 
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taxable and tax-exempt corporations and unions.  Because the distinction 
between independent expenditures and contributions is far from clear, the 
use of expendable intermediaries to move money that will not be traced 
to their original source provides both protection from miscalculation with 
respect to the legal risks of transferring money intended to have the effect 
of a contribution while being made in a form intended to create the 
appearance that it is an independent expenditure.16 
Fourth, a money trail may be an efficient structure for blending 
established organizations with their own sources of money and their own 
electoral agendas with the special purpose entities created expressly to 
function as barriers to disclosure in the larger money trail.  For example, 
the National Rifle Association (“NRA”) appears in the diagram of the 
Koch Brothers’ money trails.17  The NRA is a powerful political actor in its 
own right.18  Its appearance in the Koch Brothers’ money trail might be 
regarded as an alliance, with the money trail offering a mechanism for 
implementing such alliances for carefully negotiated purposes related to 
a defined goal over a specified period of time. 
Fifth, a money trail as carefully constructed as the money trail 
developed by the Koch Brothers offers a politically potent blend of highly 
centralized command and control with the appearance of diffuse 
authority and broad participation.  This perception of shared goals and 
shared strategies might well be useful in obscuring the presence of 
organizations that seem to function solely as accommodation parties in 
moving money and special purpose entities that enable particular 
transfers among particular parties.  There were some indications, during 
the 2012 election cycle and its aftermath, that the Koch Brothers wanted as 
much centralized control as possible and that they would make changes 
in their model to achieve it.19  But, it is likely that neither the Koch Brothers 
                                                 
16 See infra Part II (describing the difference between independent expenditures and 
contributions). 
17 The Koch Network, supra note 2. 
18 See, e.g., Walter Hickey, How the NRA Became the Most Powerful Special Interest in 
Washington, BUS. INSIDER (Dec. 18, 2012, 1:43 PM), http://www.businessinsider.com/nra-
lobbying-money-national-rifle-association-washington-2012-12, archived at 
http://perma.cc/X2H4-Q76Y (analyzing how the NRA is a powerful political actor). 
19  These efforts had become clearer during the 2014 election cycle.  See Nicholas 
Confessore, Kochs’ Network Wrestles with Expectations for Presidential Primaries, N.Y. TIMES 
(Aug. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/31/us/politics/kochs-network-
wrestles-with-expectations-for-presidential-primaries.html, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
K4JM-HQQX  (describing the Kochs as having “cleaned house” and “retooled their data 
efforts and grassroots outreach”); Matea Gold and Tom Hamburger, Koch Industries Adopts 
New Public Posture to Neutralize Opponents, Recast Image, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/koch-industries-adopts-new-public-posture-to 
-neutralize-opponents-recast-image/2014/09/07/a85e8484-3502-11e4-a723-fa3895a25d02_ 
story.html, archived at http://perma.cc/U3LD-HMYD (describing an offensive against the 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 49, No. 2 [2015], Art. 10
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol49/iss2/10
2015] Dark Money in Motion 511 
nor any other political actors playing similar roles would want their roles 
to be fully understood even by their supporters, much less by their 
detractors. 
Different money trails may well accord different priorities to these 
and other reasons for money trails raise a number of largely unaddressed 
questions that underscore how little is in fact known about money trails 
in politics.  The following discussion about what is not known serves as a 
preliminary research guide, as well as a guide to the possible ways of 
characterizing money trails.  Any effort to inventory what is not now 
known and what analysts might find particularly useful to know is limited 
by the fact that the money in question is both dark and in motion.  It may 
well be that other questions become as more significant as more is 
discovered about the money trails of contemporary politics. 
The first question is how money trails are financed.  Is there one major 
source of funds, or do other participants buy-in by making financial 
contributions.  Much of the discussion of the Koch money trails seems to 
assume that the Koch Brothers are the primary contributor.20  Much of the 
discussion of the money trails seems aimed at attempting to document the 
nature and the extent of the Koch contributions.  The focus on the limited 
liability companies (“LLCs”) that directed money to the core entities are 
assumed to have been established to obscure the amount if not the source 
of the Koch money.  By focusing so intensely on the Koch’s contributions, 
other possible funding sources that might be important for understanding 
money trails may be overlooked.  For example, the Koch Brothers hold 
invitation-only donor meetings every six months.  These private meetings 
begin with policy discussions and appearances by invited politicians and 
end with a donor-only pledge meeting, which has been described by one 
observer as having an atmosphere akin to a revival meeting.21  How this 
money is used and what share of the funding of the money trails has been 
raised through these pledge meetings is unknown.  In addition, at least 
one other high-profile billionaire reportedly contributed to the Koch 
money trails redesigned for the 2014 mid-term election, although neither 
he nor his representatives confirmed this or any other commitment of 
funds for the 2014 election cycle.  The terms under which such transfers of 
funds were made, if they were, are unknown.  In a rare lapse in security 
                                                 
Democrats’ Democracy Alliance, which is described as the “hub for wealthy liberal 
contributors”). 
20 Koch-Backed Political Network, supra note 2. 
21 See Kenneth P. Vogel & Tarini Parti, Inside Koch World, POLITICO (June 15, 2012, 4:35 
AM), http://dyn.politico.com/printstory.cfm?uuid=2D316FDA-68AB-4826-A61A-20A870 
506921, archived at http://perma.cc/7SJF-ERV5 (describing the Koch summits). 
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at their donor conference in early 2014, the Kochs left a confidential 
document in a meeting room.22 
The second question relates to the focal point of decision-making 
within the money trails.  How centralized is decision-making and how is 
the degree of centralization determined?  Who decides what issues and 
how do the answers matter?  Again, in the Koch money trails, it is 
assumed that the Kochs make the decisions, but no one knows what this 
means in operational terms.  Who controls what decisions and at what 
level of specificity?  How are disagreements, if any, among the 
components of the money trail addressed?  Again, much of the focus on 
the Koch money trails focused on those organizations that appear to have 
been established by the Koch Brothers and which appear to be represented 
by the same law firm, which is also linked to the Koch Brothers.  But, there 
are other organizations with their own money and their own agendas in 
the Koch money trails, and their roles have scarcely been considered. 
The third question deals with the roles played by various 
components’ entities of the money trails.  Do some organizations engage 
overtly in political speech while others do not?  Do some organizations 
collect money?  Do some organizations serve primarily as conduits, 
intermediaries, or accommodation parties?  If these various roles can be 
identified within money trails, how and by whom are these roles 
determined?  No one viewing money trails from the outside can answer 
these questions with any confidence.  But, assuming something akin to 
these roles can be identified, what purpose does this kind of a division of 
labor and specialization of function serve in a money trail?23  Defeating 
disclosure would not seem to require anything this complex, given the 
protection against disclosure offered by the entities in the money trails.  
Implementing centralized command and control would be consistent with 
this kind of division of functions.24  It would enhance the ability of those 
exercising control to monitor the functioning of components, and it would 
allow for rapid responses by having each component know the extent, and 
thus the limits, of their roles.  But, this reveals little about the basis of the 
authority of those who exercise command and control functions.  Are 
these functions reserved to those who finance the creation and ongoing 
operation of a money trail?  Is it possible to have a money trail in the 
                                                 
22 See Andy Kroll and Daniel Schulman, The Koch Brothers Left a Confidential Document at 
Their Donor Conference, MOTHER JONES (Feb. 5, 2014), http://www.motherjones.com/ 
politics/2014/02/koch-brothers-palm-springs-donor-list, archived at http://perma.cc/ 
24JA-FEAT (showing close ties between Koch Industries and the Koch Brothers’ political 
entities and activities). 
23 See EMILE DURKHEIM, THE DIVISION OF LABOR IN SOCIETY 1–7 (N.Y., Macmillan 1933) 
(explaining the concept of division of labor). 
24 See infra Part II (describing the centralized command and control of money trails). 
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absence of a primary donor?  Efforts by some in the Democratic Party to 
approximate a modest money trail might provide further information on 
these issues. 
This question is closely linked to issues relating to the degree of self-
determination accorded the component entities that operate politically 
both as components of a money trail and independently of the money trail.  
Certainly, the NRA is not limited to a role in the Koch Brothers’ money 
trail.25  Does this external autonomy enhance discretion within a specific 
money trail?  The same question might well be raised with respect to 
Sheldon Adelson, who certainly is not constrained by his reported transfer 
of money to the Koch money trail.26 
In light of how little is known about money trails and recognizing that 
much that appears to be at least potentially important is not known, 
thinking about what concepts might facilitate the analysis of money trails 
might seem premature.  Yet, without conceptual frameworks, efforts to 
find and develop data are inhibited.  So, without claiming that considering 
conceptual analogues will resolve the questions raised above, this Essay 
considers a limited number of concepts that might prove useful in 
characterizing and analyzing money trails.27 
In exploring issues of characterization, the foundational question is 
whether a money trail is “something” apart from its components that 
enables the components to operate more effectively than they would 
operate on their own.  Is it useful to think of characterizing a money trail 
as “something” or would it be more useful to characterize particular 
transactions between and among the component entities?  If one suspects 
that both are important, how does one account for both and for how each 
perspective shapes the other? 
Organizations can be analyzed as entities or as aggregates.28  Looking 
at a money trail as an aggregate puts the focus on the characteristics of the 
component entities and on the transactions between and among the 
component entities.  This inquiry necessarily focuses on the law under 
which the components are organized.  The legal terms of their 
organizational existence will define what each component contributes to 
the money trail and what organizational features constrain their roles.  In 
                                                 
25 See The Koch Network, supra note 2 (showing other donations the NRA makes and 
receives). 
26 See Adelson, Sheldon G. & Miriam O.:  Donor Detail, OPEN SECRETS, 
http://www.opensecrets.org/outsidespending/donor_detailp?cycle=2012&id=U00000003
10&type=I&super=N&name=Adelson%2C+Sheldon+G.+%26 (last visited Apr. 20, 2014), 
archived at http://perma.cc/PSP8-SS6V (listing all the organizations to which Sheldon and 
Miriam Adelson have contributed). 
27 See infra Part II (considering ways to characterize and analyze money trails). 
28 R. H. Coase, The Nature of the Firm, 4 ECONOMICA 386, 393–94 (Nov. 1937). 
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the Koch money trails from the 2012 election cycle, the section 501(c)(4) 
social welfare organizations, the LLCs, and the trusts all bring their own 
defenses against disclosure of both contributors to them and expenditures 
they themselves make.29  Both are essential in a money trail based on 
putting money in motion and eventually deploying it for a political 
objective.  A money trail consisting of non-disclosing entities defeats 
efforts to trace money.  As a result, those who fund components of money 
trails can have a reasonable expectation that, if a particular transfer of 
money is treated as a contribution to a candidate, this amount will not be 
traced back to them.  The immediate transferor might be found to have 
acted in a manner inconsistent with its exempt status or to have violated 
federal election law, but that transferor can be an accommodation party 
that is dispensable and disposable. 
Looking at a money trail as an entity, in contrast, puts the focus on the 
command and control structure of a money trail.  It raises such questions 
as whether there is a command and control structure?  Who operates this 
structure and on what factors is their authority based?  Does the largest 
donor operate the command and control structure?  What kind of control 
is exercised?  To what extent does it define the roles of various types of 
parties?  What are the incentives for acceptance of centralized direction? 
None of these questions have satisfactory answers based on current 
data.  But, asking these questions contributes to crafting an analytical 
framework that might help understand additional information on the 
structure and operation of various types of money trails.  This Essay 
suggests that two possible analogues to money trails might prove useful 
in developing such an analytical framework.  The first is the concept of a 
network, which is now being widely used in the study of political parties 
and certain other political actors.30  The second is the model of the now-
defunct but still (in)famous Enron Corporation, which created and 
controlled a number of special purpose entities to conduct special projects 
to create the appearance of a strong balance sheet as well as to achieve 
certain abusive tax advantages.31  This model has not yet been used to 
analyze political actors. 
                                                 
29 Robert Maguire & Viveca Novak, Exclusive: Largest Dark Money Donor Groups Share 
Funds, Hide Links, OPENSECRETS (Sept. 10, 2013), http://www.opensecrets.org/news/2013/ 
09/exclusive-largest-dark-money-donor-groups-hide-ties-using-new-trick/, archived at 
http://perma.cc/76RX-H4SK. 
30 See Brian Uzzi, The Sources and Consequences of Embeddedness for the Economic Performance 
of Organizations:  The Network Effect, 61 AM. SOCIOLOGICAL REV. 674, 674–76 (Aug. 1996) 
(describing the concept of a market). 
31 See STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., VOL. I:  REPORT OF 
INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP. AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND 
COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 2, 8–10 (Comm. Print Feb. 2003) 
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The concept of a network encompasses a broad range of relationships 
among the components.32  There are no limits based on ownership or other 
forms of control defining affiliation.33  A network can encompass multiple 
types of relationships.  Similarly, a network approach is not limited by 
varying treatment of component entities under election law or tax law or 
business entity law.  In addition, a network can also encompass varying 
degrees of centralized control and various types of command and control 
structures.  As a result, network analysis is well-adapted to tracing money 
through relationships that are novel and even confusing if one is 
accustomed to viewing the movement of political money through the 
prism of only one body of law. 
In addition to these reasons for analyzing money trails as networks, 
network analysis is being used to explore the “ecosystem” of political 
networks.  Money trails are not the only type of political organization that 
is raising significant sums of money and implementing tactical and 
strategic plans that require carefully defined relationships with other 
political actors.  Political scientists found the network concept a useful 
analytical framework for analyzing contemporary political parties and 
other political organizations that cannot be insightfully analyzed using the 
older, more hierarchical approaches of the past.34 
The Enron approach focuses more directly on command and control 
issues.35  Enron is a case study of the design of command and control 
through relationships that will not trigger reporting requirements under 
the then-applicable law based on concepts of control that did not capture 
the substance of the actual relationships and transactions.  The command 
and control system Enron developed to insulate the special purpose 
entities from the kind of financial reporting and disclosure that was 
required with respect to its subsidiary corporations rested not on 
                                                 
[VOL. I:  ENRON REPORT] (discussing the investigation of tax abuse using special purpose 
entities and recommendations for reform); STAFF OF JOINT COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 108TH 
CONG., VOL. II:  REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP. AND RELATED ENTITIES 
REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS, 
APPENDICES A & B  (Comm. Print Feb. 2003) (analyzing specific transactions); STAFF OF JOINT 
COMMITTEE ON TAXATION, 108TH CONG., VOL. III:  REPORT OF INVESTIGATION OF ENRON CORP. 
AND RELATED ENTITIES REGARDING FEDERAL TAX AND COMPENSATION ISSUES, AND POLICY 
RECOMMENDATIONS, APPENDICES C & D (Comm. Print Feb. 2003) (providing opinion letters 
from lawyers and accountants relating to specific projects). 
32 See Uzzi, supra note 30, at 674–76 (establishing the concept of a network). 
33 See id. at 674–75 (explaining how networks have the ability to change organizations). 
34 Richard Skinner, Seth Masket & David Dulio, 527 Committees, Formal Parties and Party 
Adaptation, 11 FORUM 137, 137 (2013).  The American Political Science Association now has a 
section on network analysis in political science.  Political Networks, AM. POL. SCI. ASS’N (2014), 
http://www.polinetworks.org/, archived at http://perma.cc/WR69-4Y6Y. 
35 VOL. I:  ENRON REPORT, supra note 31. 
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ownership but on management.36  Managers of the special purpose 
entities were Enron managers.  The special purpose entities were 
developed and operated to play roles in projects designed by Enron for 
the benefit of Enron.  This was a system of control in substance but not 
expressed through the forms on which accounting principles, federal 
income tax reporting, and reporting to other agencies such as the 
Securities and Exchange Commission depended.  Because the special 
purpose entities were operating under a new model of control, few experts 
inside or outside government saw the entire picture for what it was.  The 
continuous change in the types of so-called projects involving new special 
purpose entities obscured the larger design of the entire project designed 
and operated to benefit Enron by creating the illusion of profit without 
taxation that appeared, while it lasted, to make Enron the very paradigm 
of a modern corporation posed to provide the model for the twenty-first 
century. 
Enron imploded dramatically, taking the Arthur Andersen 
accounting firm with it.37  Other forms of corporate tax shelters continued 
to appear, supported by tax opinions issued by tax lawyers who certainly 
knew the interpretive infirmities in their opinion letters.  The IRS battled 
tax shelters through audits and through changes in tax law.  The Joint 
Committee on Taxation issued a comprehensive report on what happened 
and how it was done.38  Congress amended the Code to require that 
taxpayers identify any transactions that were “abusive” with it under the 
new statutory definitions.  This latter change’s greater transparency with 
respect to transactions allowed the IRS to audit corporate returns more 
effectively and efficiently. 
The Enron model provides the important insight that old forms and 
old assumptions can be bypassed by creative design based on changing 
fundamental assumptions.  Understanding the assumptions and 
categories of current law is the foundation for designing approaches that 
operate outside current law.  These new designs do not violate the law so 
much as simply disregard it.  An approach to law based solely on form 
                                                 
36 Id. 
37 Tom Fowler, Enron’s Implosion was Anything but Sudden, HOUS. CHRON. (June 30, 2004), 
http://www.chron.com/business/enron/article/Enron-s-implosion-was-anything-but-
sudden-1569592.php, archived at http://perma.cc/DK77-2PC3; see also C. William Thomas, 
The Rise and Fall of Enron:  When a Company Looks Too Good to be True, It Usually Is, J. ACCT. 
(Apr. 2002), http://www.journalofaccountancy.com/Issues/2002/Apr/TheRiseAndFallOf 
Enron.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/NCG3-D2ER (describing Arthur Andersen as 
“preparing for a storm of litigation as well as a possible criminal investigation in the wake 
of the Enron collapse”). 
38 VOL. I:  ENRON REPORT, supra note 31. 
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can always be disregarded by designing new approaches that take 
advantage of form-based premises. 
II.  MONEY TRAILS AND DISREGARDED LAW 
Money trails exist outside of the law, which is not to say that they are 
lawless or unlawful.  Whether analyzed as networks or as a structure of 
centrally controlled special purpose entities, money trails are outside of 
the law in two senses.  In the first sense, few provisions of current law 
apply to money trails whether considered as an entity or an aggregate of 
components.  In the second sense, those provisions that might apply to 
certain transactions in certain circumstances are now “disregarded” by the 
Supreme Court and not enforced by either the FEC or IRS.  A statute or a 
judicial precedent is “disregarded” if it has not been found 
unconstitutional or overruled but is not taken into account by the Court 
in cases where it might reasonably be thought relevant. 
This section of the Essay explores the concept of disregarded law by 
considering the issue of whether money trails are making independent 
expenditures or contributions and, as part of this analysis, asking who 
might be the speaker or the contributor.  These are questions that are 
thought to have answers in federal election law or federal tax law.  
Because money trails consists of entities, determining whether particular 
uses of money constitute independent expenditures or contributions 
involves complex issues of how money is treated as it moves from one 
organization to another and to yet others after that. 
Citizens United addressed only independent expenditures.39  The 
election law prohibition on contributions by corporations and unions 
remains in place.  The Court held that this prohibition on corporate 
contributions applies to nonprofit corporations like the section 501(c)(4) 
social welfare organizations that are commonly found in the money 
trails.40  If the money trails are moving money that finds its way into a 
candidate’s campaign committee, thereby becoming a contribution 
instead of an independent expenditure, then some or all of the 
components of the money trail might well be found to have violated 
federal election law.  No one has a clear idea of how this analysis would 
apply to money trails characterized either as aggregates or entities.  
Indeed, it is possible that one purpose of moving money in sometimes 
inexplicable patterns might be designed to defeat any such inquiry. 
Current law does not recognize the role of networks and provides for 
tracing money in only very limited circumstances.  Money used to make a 
                                                 
39 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 361 (2010). 
40 FEC v. Beaumont, 539 U.S. 146, 149 (2003). 
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contribution to a candidate will be traced in cases where there is some 
evidence that the apparent contributor is a “straw contributor” who is not 
the actual source of the money contributed.41  This has been done in cases 
involving individuals, but not in the multi-entity money trails that came 
to public attention in the 2012 election cycle. 
The distinction created in Buckley between independent expenditures 
and contributions has not been overruled.42  Under the reasoning in 
Buckley, an independent expenditure is given the highest level of 
protection under the First Amendment because the source of the money is 
also the speaker.43  A contribution is given a lesser level of protection 
because the source of the money enables speech by the candidate, who is 
treated as the speaker.44  Buckley, then, addresses the question of who is a 
speaker and not just the question of whether the speech is political speech 
which is protected under the First Amendment.45  This is a transactional 
framework for campaign finance that requires identification of the source 
of the money as well as of the end user, or speaker.  An independent 
expenditure is based on the premise that the funder is also the speaker.46  
A contribution, in contrast, is a transfer of money to enable the candidate 
to speak.47  The difference between independent expenditures and 
                                                 
41 The Federal Election Campaign Act, 52 U.S.C. § 30116(a)(8) (2000), provides that: 
For purposes of the limitations imposed by this section, all contributions 
made by a person, either directly or indirectly, on behalf of a particular 
candidate, including contributions which are in any way earmarked or 
otherwise directed through an intermediary or conduit to such 
candidate, shall be treated as contributions from such person to such 
candidate. The intermediary or conduit shall report the original source 
and the intended recipient of such contribution to the Commission and 
to the intended recipient. 
Id. 
42 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 12–13 (1976) (per curiam); see Adam Liptak, Supreme Court 
Strikes Down Overall Political Donation Cap, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 2, 2014), available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/04/03/us/politics/supreme-court-ruling-on-campaign-
contributions.html?_r=0, archived at http://perma.cc/UC86-LAA8 (providing insight into 
Chief Justice Roberts’ opinion that he found no need to revisit Buckley’s distinction between 
contributions and expenditures). 
43 Buckley, 424 U.S. at 49, 51. 
44 Id. at 22. 
45 Id. at 20–22. 
46 See 2 U.S.C. § 30101(17) defines independent expenditure in the following terms: 
The term independent expenditure means an expenditure by a person for 
a communication expressly advocating the election or defeat of a clearly 
identified candidate that is not made in cooperation, consultation, or 
concert with, or at the request or suggestion of, a candidate, a 
candidate’s authorized committee, or their agents, or a political party 
committee or its agents. 
Id. 
47 52 U.S.C. § 30101(8)(A)(i)–(ii).  The term “contribution” includes: 
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contributions turns on the nexus between the source of the money and the 
speaker. 
The question of nexus remains inadequately conceptualized in 
Buckley, largely because the Court focused on individuals as both funders 
and speakers in an independent expenditure.  In this case, the nexus is 
established by evidence the funder and the speaker are the same 
individual.  The analysis is far less straightforward when an individual 
makes a contribution to an organization.  Although the Buckley Court 
referred to organizations, it did not analyze organizations as 
organizations or consider the implications of such an analysis for 
determining who is the funder and who is the speaker.  These questions 
are difficult when an individual makes a contribution to one association.  
They become far more difficult when the individual’s contribution is 
moved through a network of organizations without the individual’s 
knowledge or consent.48   
These questions cannot be addressed satisfactorily by applying 
current legal concepts.  Election law has no provisions directly applicable 
to money in motion in the case of independent expenditures.  The 
provisions applicable to contributions prohibit making contributions in 
the name of another, but these have not involved transfers among entities 
that characterize contemporary money trails.  This absence of applicable 
law is an important factor in facilitating the design and operation of 
money trails.  It also facilitates broad judicial flexibility because there is so 
little law to disregard.  However, two judicial precedents were potentially 
relevant to the money trails.  In Citizens United, the Court overruled one 
and disregarded the other.49  Both of these cases considered the question 
of the relationship between a contributor to a tax-exempt organization and 
the organization that sought to use general treasury funds for 
independent expenditures that expressly advocated the election or defeat 
of a clearly identified candidate for public office.  A brief discussion of 
these two cases helps to clarify the difficulties in identifying the source of 
funds and the speaker, and thus the difficulty in treating a particular use 
of money as an independent expenditure. 
                                                 
any gift, subscription, loan, advance, or deposit of money or anything of value 
made by any person for the purpose of influencing any election for Federal office; 
or the payment by any person of compensation for the personal services of another 
person which are rendered to a political committee without charge for any 
purpose. 
Id. 
48 Frances R. Hill, Nonparticipatory Association and Compelled Political Speech:  Consent as a 
Constitutional Principle in the Wake of Citizens United, 35 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 550 
(2011). 
49  Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 320 (2010). 
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The first case was FEC v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life (MCFL), which 
involved a section 501(c)(4) social welfare organization that advocated 
policies opposed to abortion.50  The case focused on a special edition of the 
organization’s newsletter that featured a score card that rated candidates 
on issues relating to abortion.51  The threshold issue in the case was 
whether the special edition constituted express advocacy or issue 
advocacy.  The Court held that the special edition constituted express 
advocacy and, thus, that the expenditure in question was an independent 
expenditure.52  Section 441(b) of federal election law prohibited “any 
corporation” from using its treasury funds to make independent 
expenditures and required that corporations make such expenditures 
through controlled section 527 political action committees.53 
The Court held that the prohibition on independent expenditures was 
unconstitutional when applied to MCFL but not when applied to either 
business corporations or tax-exempt corporations that accepted funding 
from either unions or business corporations, both of which were subject to 
the prohibition on the use of corporate treasury funds for independent 
expenditures.54  MCFL could have funded the special edition of its 
newsletter through the controlled political action committee it had 
established in 1980.55  The Court dismissed the relevance of the political 
action committee to the case before it.56  The Court identified “three 
features essential to our holding” that MCFL was not subject to section 
441(b).57  The first was that MCFL “was formed for the express purpose of 
promoting political ideas, and cannot engage in business activities.”58  The 
second was that, as a nonprofit organization, it had no shareholders or 
                                                 
50 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 242 (1986). 
51 Id. at 243–44. 
52 Id. at 249. 
53 52 U.S.C. § 30118(a) (2012). 
54 Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 263. 
55 Id. at 255 n.8. 
56 Id. 
57 Id. at 263–64. 
58 Id. at 264.  Both clauses of this statement are incorrect.  Had MCFL been formed to 
promote political ideas, it would be treated as a section 527 political committee.  MCFL was 
formed to oppose policies permitting abortion through issue advocacy and lobbying and was 
permitted to engage in election campaign activities to an extent never defined in tax law.  
MCFL could have engaged in business activities, which would have been taxed under the 
unrelated business income tax of sections 511–14 if they were unrelated to the organization’s 
exempt purpose but would not have been taxed at all if they have been business activities 
“related” to MCFL’s exempt purpose.  This point was made to bolster the argument that 
MCFL was not a business corporation.  Id. at 241.  For purposes of this case, the statement 
correctly described the fact that MCFL did not engage in any business activities, but it 
remains incorrect as a description of the law. 
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other persons with a “claim on its assets or earnings.”59  As a result, people 
connected with the organization “will have no economic disincentive for 
disassociating with it if they disagree with its political activity.”60  The 
third is that “MCFL was not established by a business corporation or a 
labor union, and it is its policy not to accept contributions from such 
entities.”61  The Court concluded that this kind of organizational 
independence “prevents such corporations from serving as conduits for 
the type of direct spending that creates a threat to the political 
marketplace.”62  These three elements were subsequently incorporated 
into the regulations defining independent expenditures.63 
These three elements taken together provided the nexus between the 
contributor to MCFL and MCFL’s use of the funds to finance independent 
expenditures even though contributors to the organization had no formal 
role in determining how the organization used the funds, which they 
contributed.  The Court reasoned: 
It is true that a contributor may not be aware of the exact 
use to which his or her money ultimately may be put, or 
the specific candidate that it may be used to support.  
However, individuals contribute to a political 
organization in part because they regard such a 
contribution as a more effective means of advocacy than 
spending the money under their own personal direction.  
Any contribution therefore necessarily involves at least 
some delegation of authority to use such funds in a 
manner that best serves the shared political purposes of 
the organization and contributor.64 
The Court also suggested that contributors could earmark their 
contributions for particular purposes.65  The MCFL Court preserves at 
least some elements of nexus in defining an independent expenditure. 
The second case was Austin v. Michigan Chamber of Commerce, which 
involved a section 501(c)(6) chamber of commerce that wanted to use its 
general treasure funds to finance an independent expenditure.66  In Austin, 
the Court held that a section 501(c)(6) supported in part by contributions 
                                                 
59 Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 264. 
60 Id. 
61 Id. 
62 Id. 
63 11 C.F.R. § 114.10 (2012). 
64 Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. at 261. 
65 Id. 
66 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1989). 
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from taxable corporations could not make an independent expenditure 
using its general treasury funds.67  The Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
had exhausted the resources of its controlled section 527 political action 
committee and could not raise additional money through member 
solicitation during the election cycle at issue.68  The ad it proposed to 
finance with its treasury funds would expressly advocate the election of 
an identified candidate for public office, which meant that the expenditure 
was an independent expenditure for purposes of federal election law and 
not issue advocacy, which is not subject to federal election law.69 
The Court held that the exception it had created in MCFL did not 
apply because taxable corporations funded the Michigan Chamber of 
Commerce.70  As it had in MCFL, the Court based its reasoning on the 
claim that the aggregation of wealth in corporate form posed a risk of 
corruption or the appearance of corruption, which was the compelling 
government interest identified in Buckley that permitted the regulation of 
political speech.71  The Court found that both contributions and 
independent expenditures presented the danger of this kind of corruption 
and were thus subject to regulation.72  The Court in Austin found that the 
contributions from taxable corporations created the possibility of “the 
corrosive and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that 
are accumulated with the help of the corporate form.”73  In addition, the 
Court found that the members of the Michigan Chamber of Commerce 
could not predict which candidate the organization would choose to 
support or oppose using, at least in part, the dues paid by members and 
that members who objected to the political activities but valued the other 
activities of the organization could not simply leave the organization.74  
All of these factors distinguished Austin from MCFL and supported the 
Court’s holding that the Michigan Chamber of Commerce could not use 
its treasury funds to finance independent expenditures.75 
Citizens United addressed a fact pattern that implicated both of these 
precedents.  Citizens United, a section 501(c)(4) organization, was 
                                                 
67 Id. at 664–65. 
68 Id. at 656. 
69 Id. 
70 Id. at 664–65. 
71 See id. at 659 (citing Citizens United v. Mass. Citizens for Life, 479 U.S. 238, 257 (1986); 
Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 47 (1976)) (recognizing a compelling government interest of 
preventing corruption as in MCFL, and also recognizing the “danger of real or apparent 
corruption” that the corporate funding could have on candidacy found in Buckley). 
72 Austin, 494 U.S. at 659–60. 
73 Id. at 660. 
74 Id. at 662–63. 
75 Id. at 669. 
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supported by both individual and corporate contributions.76  It claimed 
that its expenditures relating to a film that took a negative view of Hillary 
Clinton during the 2008 election cycle while she was a candidate for the 
Democratic Party nomination for President was issue advocacy  properly 
characterized as education of the public and thus outside the scope of 
federal election law.77  The Court found that the film constituted the 
functional equivalent of express advocacy.78 
At this point, the Court had a choice of rejecting Citizens United’s 
claim, granting the claim by relaxing the requirements for satisfying the 
exception crafted in MCFL, or granting the claim by overturning the 
prohibition on independent expenditures by corporations.  The Court 
expressly rejected relaxing the requirements for satisfying the MCFL 
exception and instead overturned the prohibition on independent 
expenditures funded by using the corporation’s general treasury funds.79 
To achieve this result, the Court simply ignored the reasoning in 
Buckley and MCFL that focused on a nexus between the source of the 
money and the speaker.80  Had it addressed this issue, the Court would 
have had two options.  One would have been to treat the corporation as 
the source of the funds in its general treasury.  The other would have been 
to acknowledge that the funds in the general treasury were derived from 
multiple sources outside the organizations as well as corporate earnings, 
particularly in the case of taxable corporations, which would have raised 
issues of participation and representation that the Court did not choose to 
address.81 
It is at this point that the reasoning in Citizens United becomes a parade 
of result-driven paradoxes.  The two options for dealing with the nexus 
issue operate differently in the context of taxable and tax-exempt 
corporations.  The general treasury funds of taxable corporations are 
derived primarily from earned income, as well as from the sale of 
corporate equity and corporate debt.  But, shareholders and bondholders 
have a claim on the general treasury for either the payment of dividends, 
depending on the type of stock held, or for the return of capital and the 
payment of interest in the case of investments in debt instruments.82  The 
earned income can reasonably be treated as the corporation’s money, 
which makes it reasonable and perhaps easy to treat the corporation as 
both the source of the funds and the speaker who makes the independent 
                                                 
76 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 319 (2010). 
77 Id. at 319–20 (describing the Hillary movie). 
78 Id. at 326 (finding Hillary to be the functional equivalent of express advocacy). 
79 Id. at 412. 
80 Id. at 356, 359 (comparing Citizens United to Buckley and MCFL). 
81 Hill, supra note 48. 
82 Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 477 (2010). 
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expenditure.  The question in the context of taxable corporations relate to 
the amounts derived from investments made by shareholders and 
investors in corporate bonds, which are likely to have been made for the 
purpose of making a profitable return on the investments, not to support 
the political agenda of the corporation.  Indeed, investors may not have 
any idea that the corporation has a political agenda and perhaps no way 
of finding out whether the corporation has a political agenda at the time 
that they make their investment.  Both equity investors and investors in 
corporate debt have continuing claims on corporate earnings.  Holders of 
corporate equity have a vote on some matters of corporate governance.  
Because of the earned income, the corporation can claim to be a source of 
at least some of the general treasury funds, but this is not a claim that can 
exclude the claim of shareholders and investors in corporate debt 
instruments, that they have also provided part of the funds in the general 
treasury.  In the case of a taxable corporation, there is some nexus between 
the source and the speaker, but not the kind of nexus required under the 
MCFL requirements. 
The general treasury funds of tax-exempt organizations come from 
some combination of contributions and earned income, depending on the 
types of exempt organization involved and the operational model of each 
particular organization.  Citizens United derived its general treasury funds 
from contributions, with no reference to earned income, not even to the 
“bake sales” that engaged the Court in MCFL.83  The same seems to have 
been true of Austin.  The difference was that Austin accepted contributions 
from taxable corporations.84  Citizens United accepted a relatively small 
amount of corporate contributions, with the bulk of the general treasury 
funds coming from individual contributions.85  There is no reference to 
earned income.  In the case of tax-exempt organizations, it is far more 
problematic to ignore the contributors as the source of funds used for 
independent expenditures.  But, because most exempt entities do not have 
voting members, it is very difficult to characterize the contributors as 
speakers.  Again, in a somewhat different way, the MCFL nexus 
requirement cannot be satisfied. 
The majority opinion in Citizens United, however, could not consider 
these distinctions because it insisted that speech is speech and all speakers, 
individuals, and corporations, have the same constitutional rights.86  
Within its own reasoning, it had no response to the departure from the 
concept of nexus in defining independent expenditures.  This does not 
                                                 
83 FEC v. Mass. Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 242 (1986). 
84 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 656 (1990). 
85 Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 319. 
86 Id. at 340. 
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explain why the Court in Citizens United overruled Austin, but disregarded 
MCFL.  The difference is explained by Austin’s holding that independent 
expenditures can pose a danger of corruption or the appearance of 
corruption when they are made by corporate entities, while MCFL created 
an exception to this prohibition because, although MCFL was a 
corporation, it did not accept contributions from corporations.87  The 
nexus requirement in MCFL was simply disregarded so that the Court in 
Citizens United could issue a broad holding that all corporations had the 
same right as individuals to make independent expenditures.  Technical 
legal issues relating to the identification of or the nexus between the 
source of the funds and the user of the funds were not permitted to limit 
this broad holding. 
Although Citizens United did not consider money in motion or 
structures at all akin to the Koch Brothers’ networks, it enabled the 
movement of money by disregarding the nexus requirement that 
addressed the issue of how to claim that an organization was both the 
source of funds and the user of funds, the core definitional element of an 
independent expenditure.  Because MCFL has not been overruled but only 
disregarded, it is possible to say that the nexus requirement still applies.  
But, this means little because the Court has signaled it will not be enforced. 
Where does this leave the money trails?  One interpretation is that the 
money trails have been freed from a potentially bothersome legal 
requirement.  The other interpretation is that the money trails now have 
no basis for claiming that their uses of money constitute independent 
expenditures if a different Court should in the future recall that MCFL is 
still formally good law.  For now, politicians of both parties appear to be 
embracing the first interpretation. 
This interpretation is bolstered by the failure, refusal, or inability of 
both the FEC and the IRS to enforce compliance with what remains of 
federal election law and of tax law applicable to dark money groups, 
especially section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations.88  A former Chair 
of the FEC, Trevor Potter, described the current situation as the “Wild 
West era of campaign finance.”89  He found that “the laws on the books 
                                                 
87 Id. at 327. 
88 For a comprehensive analysis of the requirements for tax exemption in the case of 
section 501(c)(4) social welfare organizations, see FRANCES R. HILL & DOUGLAS M. MANCINO, 
TAXATION OF EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS, Chap. 13 (2002, revised 2012). 
89 Trevor Potter, California’s FPPC Provides Examples for Dysfunctional Federal Agencies to 
Follow:  40th Anniversary Keynote Address, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CENTER BLOG (Sept. 19, 2014, 6:52 
PM), http://www.clcblog.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id= 
575:californias-fppc-provides-example-for-dysfunctional-federal-agencies-to-follow-trevor-
potters-40th-anniversary-keynote-address, archived at http://perma.cc/CUY2-8Q2P?type 
=source. 
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are merely just that, and often do not reflect actual campaign practices[.]”90  
Potter decried “political players’ ability and willingness to essentially 
nullify duly enacted laws.”91  He found that: 
There appears to be a dangerous new lawless reality in 
Washington and many states:  laws are passed by 
democratically elected legislators; the laws are then 
signed by the President or Governor, only to be 
completely frustrated by political actors who do not have 
the legislative strength to change them but do have 
sufficient strength to block their enforcement.92 
It is difficult to say whether the IRS or the FEC is more unwilling or unable 
to enforce the statutes each is expected to administer. 
In light of the Supreme Court’s disregard of applicable law and the 
enforcement failures of the two relevant federal agencies, how does one 
think about the money trails?  Is it useful or even rational to think about 
them technically in terms of laws that are disregarded and not enforced?  
Or, should one focus on the larger issue of the relationship between 
economic power and political power?  Should scholarship extend beyond 
a focus on the judicial and regulatory arenas to larger issues of the 
relationship between economic inequality and democracy? 
III.  ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POWER 
This Essay has pointed out repeatedly what is not known about the 
money trails and why money that is already shielded from disclosure is 
being put in motion and sent along such circuitous paths that often, from 
the outside, seem to have little purpose.  The one thing that is known is 
that the design, operation, and funding of money trails is not an enterprise 
for Americans of ordinary means.  Money trails are for the wealthy—
perhaps the mega-wealthy.  The purpose of this Essay is not to suggest 
that the very wealthiest Americans should not be able to organize in any 
lawful manner that they choose, but to consider what questions beyond 
the technical legal questions the use of money trails might raise.  The 
technical complexity of money trails is a form of masking that should be 
understood not only in technical terms but also in terms of political theory 
relating to the meaning of power and democracy. 
Organizing to win political power is a core activity in a democracy 
and is protected under the First Amendment rights of speech and 
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association.  It is far less clear that the First Amendment protects the right 
of economic power to determine political power.  Does the First 
Amendment protect the right of Americans of ordinary means to be heard 
in the public square even though they do not have enough money either 
individually or collectively to challenge the kind of wealth that is 
represented in the money trails?  If not, why not?  If so, what does this 
mean in practice? 
The 2012 election cycle provided clear evidence that election 
campaigns are being financed by a limited number of affluent Americans.  
In a study for the Sunlight Foundation, Lee Drutman found that, “[i]n the 
2012 election, [28%] of all disclosed political [money] came from just 
31,385 people[] [i]n a nation of 313.85 million [people.]”93  Every winning 
congressional candidate received money from this small elite group.94  Of 
the successful congressional candidates in 2012, 84% “took more money 
from these 1% of the 1% donors than they did from all of their small donors 
(individuals who gave $200 or less) combined.”95  The median 
contribution was $26,584, which was more than half of the median income 
of a family of four.96  The Sunlight Foundation described “this elite group 
of donors as the collective gatekeepers of public office.”97 
For their part, candidates for Congress face the need to raise 
significant amounts of money every day if they hope to win office or retain 
their office.  Incumbents in the House of Representatives raised an average 
of $1.64 million each, or approximately $2250 per day during their two-
year term.98  Senate incumbents who retained their seats in 2012 raised an 
average of $10.3 million, or approximately $14,125 per day.99  Both 
incumbents seeking re-election and challengers will necessarily devote 
significant amounts of time to fundraising.  What this means in practice 
was made very clear in the case of a candidate running for an open Senate 
seat when a campaign memorandum on, among other things, allocation 
of the candidate’s time, became public.100  The memoranda identified a 
                                                 
93 Lee Drutman, The Political 1% of the 1% in 2012, SUNLIGHT FOUND. (June 24, 2013, 9:00 
AM), http://www.sunlightfoundation.com/blog/2013/06/24/1pct_of_the_1pct/, archived 
at http://perma.cc/9U8J-LMZQ.  This percentage meant that in 2012 “candidates got more 
money from a smaller percentage of the population than any year for which we have data[.]”  
Id.  This study makes it clear that it does not take account of dark money, which would 
increase the disparity. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. 
96 Id. 
97 Id. 
98 Drutman, supra note 93. 
99 Id. 
100 See James Hohmann, The Michelle Nunn Memos:  10 Key Passages, POLITICO (July 28, 2014, 
6:32 PM), http://www.politico.com/story/2014/07/michelle-nunn-memos-10-key-
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fundraising target of $18 to $20 million, which “will require us to prioritize 
fundraising above all else and to focus the candidate’s time on it with 
relentless intensity.”101  The year would begin with the candidate 
spending 80% of her time on fundraising and end in October, the month 
before the election, with her spending 50% of her time fundraising.102  
There was no indication that this effort would be focused on the time-
consuming task of raising money from people of ordinary means and 
several indications that it would focus the campaign would accept 
substantial funds from various third-party affiliates of fund raising 
structures identified with the Democratic Party.  None of this is unusual.  
Nothing in the documents appears to suggest that campaign finance laws 
as currently interpreted have been violated.  The point is that everything 
in these documents appears to be consistent with the contemporary norm 
and most of it could be said, and almost certainly is being said, by every 
other Senate campaign, albeit with the obvious adjustments for which 
interest groups and third-party fundraising groups are referenced by 
candidates from the other party. 
Economic inequality shapes political campaigns as much as it shapes 
so many other elements of American society.  Candidates need money and 
know they cannot raise it from Americans of ordinary means because so 
few Americans can afford to make political contributions in any amount.  
Some Americans can give a great deal.  A few Americans can give a great 
deal more.  The money trails appear to involve the latter group, those who 
can afford to contribute millions or tens of millions of dollars and who 
want to ensure that this level of giving results in efficient investments in 
political success.103  The failure to win the presidency in 2012 seems to 
have fueled the determination to make much more effective use of the 
money trails in 2014 while making the Democrats detrained to build their 
own versions of money trails. 
In light of the confluence of increasing economic inequality and 
increasing costs of election campaigns, the question of the relationship 
between economic power and political power becomes a more acute 
practical inquiry.  This is the question that the Supreme Court refuses to 
consider because it rejects the idea that the government may have a 
                                                 
passages-109463.html, archived at http://perma.cc/SY82-YFY6 (highlighting a memoranda 
that was made public about Michelle Nunn).  The Politico story acknowledges the original 
reporting in the National Review, which posted 144 pages of campaign documents on its 
website on July 28, 2014.  Id.  The campaign did not deny the authenticity of the documents.  
Id. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. 
103 See Drutman, supra note 93 (examining the amount donated by the elite group of 
wealthy Americans). 
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compelling interest to take economic inequality into account.104  The 
Supreme Court insists that differences in economic power are irrelevant 
to understanding elections, campaign finance, representation, 
participation, and the nature of democracy.105  Addressing the political 
implications of economic inequality is not a compelling state interest for 
purposes of campaign finance cases.106  The rich must not be denied the 
right to speak to whatever extent their economic resources permit.  The 
same right is, of course, accorded to people of ordinary means who cannot 
afford to make themselves heard in the public square.  Their role is 
confined to listening to the messages by very different people with very 
different agendas. 
This reasoning was entrenched in campaign finance jurisprudence 
long before it was consolidated in Citizens United and McCutcheon.107  The 
Court in Buckley struck down the limits on independent expenditures, 
reasoning that: 
It is argued, however, that the ancillary governmental 
interest in equalizing the relative ability of individuals 
and groups to influence the outcome of elections serves 
to justify the limitations on express advocacy of the 
election or defeat of candidates imposed by [section] 
608(e)(1)’s expenditure ceiling.  But the concept that 
government may restrict the speech of some elements of 
our society in order to enhance the relative voice of others 
is wholly foreign to the First Amendment, which was 
designed “to secure ‘the widest possible dissemination of 
information from diverse and antagonistic sources,’” and 
“to assure unfettered interchange of ideas for the bringing 
about of political and social changes desired by the 
people.”108 
Through this reasoning, the Buckley Court served notice that the Court will 
not limit the amount of speech of any speaker.109  The Court based its 
                                                 
104 See Richard Briffault, Corporations, Corruption, and Complexity:  Campaign Finance After 
Citizens United, 20 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 643, 656–57 (2011) (discussing the Court’s 
rejection of economic inequality as a rationale for spending limits). 
105  Ciara Torres-Spelliscy, The Democracy We Left Behind in Greece and McCutcheon, 89 
N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 112, 115 n.17 (2014) (noting the lack of consideration by the Court of 
economic inequality). 
106 Id. at 117. 
107 Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 48–49 (1976). 
108 Id. (quoting New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266, 269 (1966), Assoc. Press 
v. United States, 326 U.S. 1, 20 (1945), and Roth v. United States, 354 U.S. 476, 484 (1957)). 
109 Id. at 48. 
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position on the evils that it saw as flowing from any limits on the overall 
amount of speech, reasoning that: 
A restriction on the amount of money a person or group 
can spend on political communication during a campaign 
necessarily reduces the quantity of expression by 
restricting the number of issues discussed, the depth of 
their exploration, and the size of the audience reached.  
This is because virtually every means of communicating 
ideas in today’s mass society requires the expenditure of 
money.110 
If market power permits Speaker A to finance far more political speech 
than Speaker B can afford to finance, then the Court will protect the right 
of Speaker A to speak up to the limits of his or her market power.  The 
Court was willing to assume that increasing the overall amount of speech 
would translate into increasing the diversity of speakers and of issues 
discussed.111  The defense of this assumption over time resulted in a 
jurisprudence that precludes any consideration of the case in which 
market power increases the total amount of speech but at the same time 
limits the number of speakers, the range of viewpoints, and the spectrum 
of issues.  The Court in both Citizens United and McCutcheon made it clear 
that it will not consider any evidence relating to this consequence of its 
jurisprudence. 
In Citizens United, the Court overruled Austin, primarily on the 
grounds that it prohibited political speech in the form of independent 
expenditures by corporations.112  The Court in Austin found a compelling 
governmental interest in preventing what it described as “the corrosive 
and distorting effects of immense aggregations of wealth that are 
accumulated with the help of the corporate form and that have little or no 
correlation to the public’s support for the corporation’s political ideas.”113  
The Court in Citizens United devoted little effort to disaggregating these 
two arguments and focusing virtually exclusively on the rights of 
corporate speakers.114 
                                                 
110 Id. at 19.  The Court observed in a footnote that “[b]eing free to engage in unlimited 
political expression subject to a ceiling on expenditures is like being free to drive an 
automobile as far and as often as one desires on a single tank of gasoline.”  Id. at 19 n.18. 
111 Id. at 19. 
112 See Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 348–56 (2010) (discussing the rationale for 
overruling Austin). 
113 Austin v. Mich. Chamber of Commerce, 494 U.S. 652, 660 (1990). 
114 See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 348–49 (noting that the Government had “virtually 
abandoned” its reliance on anti-distortion rationale and had chosen instead to rely on an 
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The Court devoted its full attention to broadening the latitude for 
wealthy contributors in its 2014 plurality decision in McCutcheon, which 
abolished the aggregate cap on contributions by individuals.  Chief Justice 
Roberts’ opinion was marked by concern for wealthy individuals who 
could not support as many candidates as they wished to support even if 
they were willing to abide by the limits on contributions to particular 
candidates, which remain in place.115  This solicitude resulted in a curt 
dismissal of the Buckley Court’s decision upholding the aggregate limits 
based on the brevity of its discussion of the issue.116 
Chief Justice Roberts’ plurality opinion does contain an element that 
provides tantalizing glimpses of what a judicial consideration of networks 
might include.117  Because McCutcheon involved contributions to 
candidates and not independent expenditures and because FECA contains 
a provision prohibiting “straw donors” and conduits, it raised the issue of 
the potential for corruption arising from efforts to disguise the true source 
of contributions.118  Describing one such pattern, Chief Justice Roberts 
observed that “it is hard to believe that a rational actor would engage in 
such machinations.”119  This remark does not inspire confidence that the 
current Court would bring a great deal of insight to the task of considering 
the claims arising in the context of the operation of a complex money trail.  
The complexity of networks might well pose a sufficiently difficult 
challenge to forestall meaningful judicial review.  Complexity may well 
prove to be a shield for the consequences of using economic power to 
consolidate political power. 
The problems arising from the Court’s willful insistence that a very 
narrow concept of quid pro quo corruption is the only compelling 
government interest that is permissible to consider in the context of 
campaign finance litigation extend beyond the realities of crafting 
arguments for litigation.120  The problem is that legal scholars appear to 
have internalized these limitations in their scholarship.  This is a 
significant problem.  Precisely because the Roberts Court’s five-Justice 
coalition agreed that quid pro quo corruption is the only permissible 
                                                 
115  McCutcheon v. FEC, 134 S. Ct. 1434, 1473–74 (2014). 
116  Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 38 (1976); see McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1446 (“Although 
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117 McCutcheon, 134 S. Ct. at 1437. 
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119 Id. at 1454. 
120 For an example of a much broader approach, see ZEPHYR TEACHOUT, CORRUPTION IN 
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government interest, it is not possible to expect the Court to provide much 
if any assistance in escaping this very small interpretative box.  The 
alternative is to engage the legal academy and the legal profession in ways 
that delegitimize the Court’s view.  To the extent that members of the legal 
academy accept the premise that the boundaries of the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence should also provide the boundaries of scholarship, they are 
shifting to the Court sole responsibility for a role that is in part theirs.  In 
other words, those legal scholars who find the current jurisprudence of 
campaign finance insufficient or even inconsistent with broad principles 
relating to the integrity of elections, should not limit their work to 
criticizing the Court solely within the small, confining, and misleading 
interpretative box that the Court created but should develop an alternative 
jurisprudence, and challenge the Roberts Court in the broader 
marketplace of jurisprudential ideas. 
This is a particularly auspicious time to bring issues of economic 
inequality into the marketplace of ideas.  There is now serious scholarship 
based on reputable data dealing with inequality and this economic 
scholarship is reaching an audience beyond the confines of academia.  
Thomas Piketty’s book has generated serious discussion among scholars 
from a broad range of academic disciplines.121  Our intellectual horizons 
need not be bound by the ungrounded assertions of a Court that seems 
unable or unwilling to address politics as it is practiced through the 
ordinary development of evidentiary records in the lower courts but 
instead addresses issues as matters of abstract theory of their own 
devising.  Those who argue before the Court must work within this system 
of constrained ideas.  Scholars are not so constrained unless they constrain 
themselves. 
                                                 
121 See generally THOMAS PIKETTY, CAPITAL IN THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2014). 
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